Tuesday, 17 March 2015

“Bhora musango” and the crisis of administration in Zimbabwe


That Zimbabwe, the whole of it suffers from a crisis of administration is no longer a contested issue. Many people read, see and emphasise the symptoms of a collapsed political and economic administration, which include corruption and a super-informal economy.

This article seeks to present the idea of “bhora musango” and its implications to politics and business in Zimbabwe. The chief argument is that the endemic and almost “normal” bhora musango may in fact generate a bigger challenge to national reconstruction as people prefer often lazy and quick-money making methods over systematic value based and often tiresome productive systems.

It is important to firstly define and describe this notion of “bhora musango”. Literally, it means kicking the ball off field. In a team of sport, the one who plays “bhora musango” is the one who passes the ball to the opponents or out of the field just to scuttle the team’s winning effort for that person’s private profit.  

This paper argues that whilst “self-interest” has been part of public and political administration in Zimbabwe, it has now permeated the Zimbabwean society and now forms part of the national mode, both in politics and business, big and small.

The splits and challenges within Zanu PF, notably after the Tsholotsho declaration to the current vanquishing of former Vice President Joyce Mujuru and her team are largely not results of ideological differences, but just “bhora musango”.

On the other hand, the splits within the opposition movement are rarely defined on ideology or group plan, but self-seeking “bhora musango”.

In economics, this idea of “Bhora musango” is often referred to as speculative economics.
Economists define speculative economics as that which “is often short term, takes large risks, especially with respect to trying to predict the future; gambling, in the hopes of making quick, large gains”.

Tim Bollerslev, an economic modeller argues that in speculative economies, rates of return tend to be high in the short term, uncorrelated over time but characterized by volatile and tranquil periods.

It is important to state that in fact speculative economics is not necessarily bad, but becomes toxic if employed alone or if it displaces productive economics.

Productive economics, in simpler terms, emphasises the use of capital, land and ideas to produce/innovate goods and services to satisfy human needs.

It is therefore my argument that millions of informal traders now fill up the streets of Zimbabwe’s cities, not necessarily because they cannot produce, but the lure of quick but often elusive gain is irresistible.

Many false “middle class” people have ex-Japan cars, farms and small businesses which they use as symbols of status. Much of it is dead, zero-producing capital.  

Such characters cover their lack of economic depth by parading labels of clothes and hence derive status and “deals” by the shoe and dress labels they wear, and not by what their ideas are worth. They make money on the basis of who they know or the political party they conveniently purport to support.

In politics, speculators are agile and unpredictable. They make the most noise especially attacking others of a different opinion in public but dine and wine with the so-called enemies at night.

Insider trading which is going on unchecked within government, where departmental buyers have become departmental suppliers is blatant corruption, but all in the stampede of this “get rich quickly” manifesto.

The recent public policy debate on whether police officers have the constitutional mandate to charge and collect “road offense fees” comes to mind. It is unconstitutional but the supporters of that process argue that “it is easier to administer road fines by police collecting it there and then than for offenders to pay at police stations or through some safe system”

Read simply, they argue that the constitution and the administration it creates are inconvenient. The constitution is now a victim of “bhora musango” as well.

Common sense means it would be very convenient for the state if offenders pay and get their funds into the cycle of public administration. But under “Bhora musango” the private interests of the “administrator” are superior, and then the state/public/povo suffer the cost of missed development.  

From a political perspective, the various short-term, egoistic political decisions and processes we witness in Zimbabwe make it difficult to read the future. Because it remains volatile and uncorrelated, I argue that Grace,  S.K Moyo, Mnangagwa, Tsvangirai or any of the front runners to state presidency are not guaranteed to take over from Cde.R.G Mugabe. Far from it!

With “bhora musango”, political succession in Zimbabwe has ceased to be mainly determined by social bases, but largely a sub-function of speculative politics. This means, among all leading contenders for state presidency, no one is purely MDC or Zanu PF, but like shifting sands, eats within all camps to maintain their short-term speculative edge.

From an economic perspective, it’s better for people to broaden their portfolios and do at least 75% production and less speculative economics in Zimbabwe.

The main actors of economic “bhora musango” may soon lose as the new post Mugabe administration, whether Zanu PF or not, would want to stabilise the country and make themselves legitimate by emphasising merit and institutions.

As a point of conclusion, as policy debates continue on the kind of Zimbabwe the future deserves, politicians must never again sink a whole country by substituting production with speculation.

Speculation must not also be killed totally as no country or administration functions purely on production alone. Both production and speculative economics and politics are necessary, but the average balance must always lie on production.

The prospect of a merit and production based Zimbabwean economy is possible but remote unless if the political leadership boldly brings order within the state. President Mugabe can no longer reform the state as he is, sadly, now held hostage by “bhora musango”. 

Whoever takes over after Mugabe may not survive two terms in power due to this “bhora musango” politics. The touchstone is to restore institutions; merit and teamwork (cross party and cross faction) to both survive and re-build production as an economic base.

Time will tell!


Itai Zimunya.... writes in his personal capacity and participates in the Institute for New Economic Thought. 

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