That Zimbabwe, the whole of it suffers from a crisis
of administration is no longer a contested issue. Many people read, see and
emphasise the symptoms of a collapsed political and economic administration,
which include corruption and a super-informal economy.
This article seeks to present the idea of “bhora musango” and its implications to politics
and business in Zimbabwe. The chief argument is that the endemic and almost “normal”
bhora musango may in fact generate a bigger
challenge to national reconstruction as people prefer often lazy and
quick-money making methods over systematic value based and often tiresome
productive systems.
It is important to firstly define and describe this notion
of “bhora musango”. Literally, it
means kicking the ball off field. In a team of sport, the one who plays “bhora musango” is the one who passes
the ball to the opponents or out of the field just to scuttle the team’s
winning effort for that person’s private profit.
This paper argues that whilst “self-interest” has
been part of public and political administration in Zimbabwe, it has now
permeated the Zimbabwean society and now forms part of the national mode, both
in politics and business, big and small.
The splits and challenges within Zanu PF, notably
after the Tsholotsho declaration to the current vanquishing of former Vice President
Joyce Mujuru and her team are largely not results of ideological differences,
but just “bhora musango”.
On the other hand, the splits within the opposition
movement are rarely defined on ideology or group plan, but self-seeking “bhora musango”.
In economics, this idea of “Bhora musango” is often referred to as speculative economics.
Economists define speculative economics as that
which “is often short term, takes large risks, especially with respect to trying to predict the future; gambling, in the hopes of making quick, large gains”.
Tim Bollerslev, an economic modeller argues that in
speculative economies, “rates of return tend to be high in the
short term, uncorrelated over time but characterized by volatile and tranquil
periods.”
It is important to state that in fact speculative economics is not necessarily bad, but becomes toxic if employed alone or if it displaces productive economics.
It is important to state that in fact speculative economics is not necessarily bad, but becomes toxic if employed alone or if it displaces productive economics.
Productive economics, in simpler terms, emphasises
the use of capital, land and ideas to produce/innovate goods and services to
satisfy human needs.
It is therefore my argument that millions of
informal traders now fill up the streets of Zimbabwe’s cities, not necessarily
because they cannot produce, but the lure of quick but often elusive gain is irresistible.
Many false “middle class” people have ex-Japan cars,
farms and small businesses which they use as symbols of status. Much of it is dead,
zero-producing capital.
Such characters cover their lack of economic depth
by parading labels of clothes and hence derive status and “deals” by the shoe
and dress labels they wear, and not by what their ideas are worth. They make
money on the basis of who they know or the political party they conveniently purport
to support.
In politics, speculators are agile and
unpredictable. They make the most noise especially attacking others of a
different opinion in public but dine and wine with the so-called enemies at
night.
Insider trading which is going on unchecked within
government, where departmental buyers have become departmental suppliers is blatant
corruption, but all in the stampede of this “get rich quickly” manifesto.
The recent public policy debate on whether police
officers have the constitutional mandate to charge and collect “road offense
fees” comes to mind. It is unconstitutional but the supporters of that process
argue that “it is easier to administer
road fines by police collecting it there and then than for offenders to pay at police
stations or through some safe system”
Read simply, they argue that the constitution and
the administration it creates are inconvenient. The constitution is now a
victim of “bhora musango” as well.
Common sense means it would be very convenient for
the state if offenders pay and get their funds into the cycle of public
administration. But under “Bhora musango”
the private interests of the “administrator” are superior, and then the
state/public/povo suffer the cost of missed development.
From a political perspective, the various
short-term, egoistic political decisions and processes we witness in Zimbabwe make
it difficult to read the future. Because it remains volatile and uncorrelated, I
argue that Grace, S.K Moyo, Mnangagwa,
Tsvangirai or any of the front runners to state presidency are not guaranteed
to take over from Cde.R.G Mugabe. Far from it!
With “bhora
musango”, political succession in Zimbabwe has ceased to be mainly determined
by social bases, but largely a sub-function of speculative politics. This
means, among all leading contenders for state presidency, no one is purely MDC
or Zanu PF, but like shifting sands, eats within all camps to maintain their short-term
speculative edge.
From an economic perspective, it’s better for people
to broaden their portfolios and do at least 75% production and less speculative
economics in Zimbabwe.
The main actors of economic “bhora musango” may soon lose as the new post Mugabe
administration, whether Zanu PF or not, would want to stabilise the country and
make themselves legitimate by emphasising merit and institutions.
As a point of conclusion, as policy debates continue
on the kind of Zimbabwe the future deserves, politicians must never again sink
a whole country by substituting production with speculation.
Speculation must not also be killed totally as no country
or administration functions purely on production alone. Both production and
speculative economics and politics are necessary, but the average balance must
always lie on production.
The prospect of a merit and production based Zimbabwean
economy is possible but remote unless if the political leadership boldly brings
order within the state. President Mugabe can no longer reform the state as he
is, sadly, now held hostage by “bhora musango”.
Whoever takes over after Mugabe may not survive two terms in power due to this “bhora musango” politics. The touchstone
is to restore institutions; merit and teamwork (cross party and cross faction) to both survive and re-build
production as an economic base.
Time will tell!
Itai
Zimunya.... writes in his personal capacity and participates in the Institute
for New Economic Thought.
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